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WHY THE CURATORIAL 
An externalist view of art
The curatorial (curatorial practices and theory) as it is 
generally conceived today developed jointly with the 
emergence of the post-object and “dematerialised” art 
that inaugurated “contemporary art” around the mid-
1960s. A decade later “curatorial studies” programs 
started emerging, reaching their peak in the first de-
cade of the century with countless programs attended 
by artists, art critics and curators. But behind the differ-
ent trends, the congruence between the artistic and the 
curatorial has made us aware of the more elementary 
fact that an artwork is inseparable from the practices 
through which it is produced and kept in existence.
I will begin by adding to this overview a two-fold ob-
servation: first, non-object art not only sabotaged the 
physical object’s static substance ontology and geo-
metric boundary but was also the redefinition of what 
an object in art is. But unlike philosophy and science it 
never really ventured into theorizing what this object is. 
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Second, because non-object art was never theorized as 
a new type of object the gap between the artwork and 
the curatorial practices relating to it was never properly 
resolved. Despite artists and curators often swapping 
roles and blurring the division between the artwork and 
the curatorial, this division has never been overcome, 
nor has it for the same reason been overcome between 
art theory and curatorial (or institutional) theory. How-
ever invasive of its curatorial frame a work can be, the 
frame always remains (at least in part) a supplement to 
it, just as it had been for more traditional works.
This text will examine this problem and present an al-
ternative to the prevalent non-object guiding paradigm 
for the curatorial. 
Before going further I have to explain non-object’s re-
definition of what an object in art is and relocate non-
object’s objectness. As Whitehead put it: “Objects are 
the elements in nature which can ‘be again’”. An ob-
ject is what can be abstracted as the “same” (invariant) 
through the flow of events. It can be defined as a physi-
cally stable visual invariant limited by an outline, but it 
can also be defined as a “dematerialised” processual 
invariant operating as a pattern within physical varia-
tions, existing virtually rather than visually and having 
no observable border. 
In defining processual invariants I will further examine a 
few artworks, but without entering into full case studies 
(which I have done more thoroughly in other papers). 
Process philosophy puts into question the assumption 
that an entity preexists its external relations. Its refusal 
to give primacy to entities over their relations cannot 
be sustained if the artwork’s boundaries are negated. 
By reestablishing the object at the level of processual 
invariance beyond non-object’s physical instability and 
geometrical non-limitation, it can then be observed in 
the context of its external relations and hence as hav-
ing no ontological primacy over them.
By bracketing the object and suspending its internal-
ity, both the object and the curatorial frame can be 
seen as working synchronically, correlated at a bound-
ary or interface. The processual invariant of the “de-
materialised” object depends on its iterative pattern, 
but its public existence also depends on the recursive-
ness (periodicity) of each curatorial practice applied 
to it. Both sides partake through their iterations in the 
process through which sameness constitutes itself as 
sameness. 
I will examine correlations between artworks and their 
curatorial frames but here again I will not enter full case 
studies.
As Whitehead, who sees the object’s “presentational 
immediacy” and the external field of “causal efficacy” 
as correlated, we see the object and its curatorial frame 
as two separate and complementary dimensions of the 
same work. 
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Non-object’s object and the topological ob-
ject of process invariance
Non-object sabotaged the physical object’s static sub-
stance ontology and geometric boundary but was also 
the redefinition of what an object in art is. Moreover, 
through this sabotage it has made us more aware and 
sensitive to the curatorial than ever.
But before discussing what object non-object is, I will 
speak of the object it is not. The object non-object 
broke away from has remained elusive in art theory, 
although assumed as being invariant on the basis of 
physical stability and geometrical limitation. Such ob-
jects caught in modernist self-referentiality (solipsism) 
had ended as being premised on naturalist and es-
sentialist grounds (presumed in the reproof of Stella’s 
famous statement: What you see is what you see). The 
consequence of this binary opposition underlying con-
temporary art since its beginning was on one hand the 
salutary sabotaging of the substantial object but, on the 
other hand, its lack of definition of what the object non-
object is when considered from another level. Besides, 
non-object artworks have kept being treated as objects 
in the economy and in law, and are designated and 
catalogued as such under a title, but they do not reflect 
upon themselves as objects. It is as if their objectness 
was a fatality, a side issue not worth speaking of.
Artworks such as Lawrence Weiner’s statements 1,   Dan-
iel Buren’s Jamais Deux Fois la Même 2, Felix Gonzalez-
Torres’ Stacks 3, Martin Creed’s installations 4 and Michel 
Blazy’s carrot paste wall coverings 5 are non-object and 
so-called “dematerialized” works. 
They are non-object in the sense that they can be de-
fined through their differences with the naturalist physi-
cal and still object: they are impermanent and endlessly 
variable (whereas an object is permanent and invari-
able), bound to the particular place and circumstances 
in which they appear (whereas an object is independent 
from them) and immersive (whereas an object is frontal), 
etc.
They are said to be “dematerialised” when between ex-
hibitions they continue to exist although not physically 
(only subsisting in contracts and protocols). 
These works are physically variable, unstable, etc. But 
does this mean that they are not objects? From the point 
of view of non-object art they are not. They are not ob-
jects because they are tied to concepts of immersion, 
interaction, process, experience, real-time time, and so 
on. But this does not prevent us from speaking of them 
as objects on another level. 
“Objects are the elements in nature which can ‘be 
again’”6. An object is an abstraction that has sufficient 
permanence to be apprehended as the “same” from one 
time to another, one place to another (when detachable) 
and one person to another. Permanence also means that 
objects exist even when not being observed. 
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In defining an object as an abstracted invariant we do 
not necessarily need to assimilate its invariance with 
physical stability or its boundary with an outline. A 
statement by Lawrence Weiner written in French or 
Greek, in red, green or another colour, on a teeshirt or 
a gallery wall is, according to the artist, the same work. 
A Stack of sweets or papers by Gonzalez-Torres is vari-
able in size but it expands beyond a physical contour 
because visitors can take units from it and eat them or 
keep them. It can disappear physically and be remade, 
yet nevertheless subsists as the same work whatever its 
state at the time we are referring to it.  A carrot wall by 
Blazy is alternatively dematerialised and rematerialised 
as the previous works are, the medium is unstable and 
evolutive, variable in size, but is nevertheless referred 
to as the same work throughout the cycle.
By enacting the destruction of the substantial and geo-
metrical object, non-object art is tremendously rich in 
providing models for redefining entities and boundar-
ies and in redefining them beyond the binary object/
non-object opposition. It provides wonderful examples 
of objects that are topological assemblages from ele-
ments that together evade any outline. The cohesion 
of these elements depends on a perspective not a 
contour, on an abstract line passing through them and 
making them work together.
A work is something made with a perspective, but as 
Deleuze explained, a perspective is not a thing upon 
which you add a point of view. The point of view has 
to also belong to the thing itself. When, in their famous 
debate, the Modernists (Greenberg and Fried) and 
the Minimalists (Morris, Andre and Judd) were arguing 
about Stella’s early paintings (around 1960-1965) they 
were not bringing different points of view of a same 
object but talking of altogether different objects 7. 
The dematerialised works mentioned above are un-
stable and cycle through different physical states (con-
structed, exhibited, destroyed, virtual in a contract 
or protocol, constructed again, etc.). The object (the 
invariant) is processual, abstracted from its own recur-
siveness (mathematicians could maybe formulate at-
tractors to them). The border is no longer identified as 
an outline but is induced, in that evidently an object 
is distinct from things it is not. It is the work’s proces-
sual invariance that allows it to be an object, something 
that can be repeated in different places and times but 
which when only subsisting as a certificate exists virtu-
ally as if it were there while not being observed.
There is no clear separation between the invariance 
of the recursive patterns I have just described and the 
work’s compositional spatial invariance because the 
work as topological assemblage has often integrated 
curatorial procedures into its composition, as do the 
works mentioned above. But it is necessary to define 
the spatial coexistence of terms in compositional in-
variance somehow separately. I will illustrate this by dis-
cussing Robert Morris’ 3 Ls (Untitled (L-Beams), 8x8x2 
feet, 1965). 
6 7
When the 3 Ls piece appeared it was seen as operat-
ing a paradigm shift in which the work was going from 
timeless to time-based, from siteless to site-specific, 
from frontal to immersive, from physically stable to im-
permanent, from a contemplative viewer to an active 
one, and so on. So for Morris the work is defined as 
entirely variable, the only constant being in his view 
the abstract configuration (mental gestalt) of the 3 L-
shaped objects. The overall working of the piece is de-
scribed by Morris as composed of the Ls (which are not 
the artwork but only a part of it), the site, the lighting 
and the viewer’s position in space 8. It is completely 
variable since the work is identified with the experience 
of the viewer and because there is no sameness from 
one experience to another. The work’s invariant is not 
the rigid disembodied gestalt as Morris had it, but the 
rule under which the set of terms he just described op-
erates. The invariant is not a substance but a dynamic 
pattern. The timeless “same” is a set of terms and the 
way they work together recursively: it is in the way in 
which the work works, or, to put it in Nelson Goodman’s 
terms, the way it has worked and will work again.
Objects do not exist prior to their external 
relations
Whitehead and process philosophy put into question 
the assumption that an entity preexists its external re-
lations, but this cannot be sustained if the artwork’s 
boundaries are negated. It is only by reestablishing 
the object at the level of processual invariance beyond 
non-object’s physical instability and geometrical non-
limitation that it can be observed in the context of its 
external relations and thus as having no ontological pri-
macy over them.
A work can be absorptive or immersive in being de-
composed and experienced in its own terms, as is the 
case for example in Morris’ 3 Ls, but it can also be 
bracketed as an object and seen interacting with other 
things than itself. We can apprehend it from within but 
we can also apprehend it from without. We constantly 
alternate these two ways of apprehending an object in 
ordinary life. Unthinkable together, each level is virtually 
contained in the other. These two modes of observa-
tion will be kept separate because accounting for the 
boundary is a methodological necessity for observing 
external relations.
Stating that the object does not preexist its external 
relations implies that this object exists in a holistic envi-
ronment, an ensemble or a field (what I call a frame or 
a context in art) coexisting with it: an external ensemble 
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with which it is interconnected through reciprocal cau-
sality. These “other things” the entity relates to are not 
“everything else” but what is selected through interre-
lations distributing a field, a context from all directions. 
This selectivity is more obvious in a living creature but 
it also applies to non-organic objects. This is in part 
how Whitehead could say that even non-organic ob-
jects can “feel.”
Artworks have the advantage over other types of arte-
facts of offering fringe relatedness to be observed in 
the curatorial. But theorizing the curatorial necessarily 
induces a discontinuity between the work and a scat-
tered and heterogeneous context of external curato-
rial operations. Both the internal and the external can 
then be seen as working synchronically, correlated at a 
boundary or interface. 
The processual approach, by introducing reciprocal cir-
cularity between causes and effects, puts into question 
the assumed preeminence of the chronological order in 
which a work is first made then is and is finally exhibited 
and administrated. But before we enter into a spatiali-
sation of time through the examination of simultaneous 
correlations between individual works and their curato-
rial contexts I will first discuss the correlations between 
the artworks and the curatorial over the history of the 
curatorial since the mid-1960s. We know artworks do 
not exist prior to receivership, that they emerge with 
their publics, thus it is also possible to monitor the si-
multaneous emergence of contemporary art and the 
contemporary art museum progressively across the 
whole of the western world and more recently beyond. 
Works emerge in public space with their publics and 
the complex curatorial contexts their public existences 
depend on. 
Where innovative works (mixed media, dematerialised, 
ephemeral, and so on) have been critical was by partak-
ing in changing practices which are distributed across 
the whole spectrum of the curatorial and its ready-to-
hand technical apparatuses (in implementing display, 
illumination, restoration, conservation, reproduction, 
legislation, etc.). Contrarily to its own belief, the “new 
art” was not critical by resisting “institutional confine-
ment” but through the changes its integration into 
the institutional machinery called for. Its conception 
of resistance presupposes a paradigm of succession in 
which the work is the origin and the museum a supple-
ment. It seems obvious with the hindsight we now have 
that both the art and the art museum have been syn-
chronically changing together9. What I am pointing out 
is the circular causal relationship between the two that 
historical hindsight now allows us to see.
Process philosophy’s refusal to give primacy to enti-
ties over their relations cannot be sustained if the split 
between work and environment is not accounted for. 
Hence from the point of view of process philosophy the 
solution to the problem is not found in merging the art 
and the curatorial further together in a single process, 
but in theorising the way in which both of them work 
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together from boundaries.
A processual invariant’s (a topological object’s) bound-
ary is not observable, it is only deduced from observing 
that it is distinguishable from things it is not. However, 
what can be better observed are the interactions, point 
by point, between the object and its context: an inter-
face at which neither object nor context can be seen 
as preexisting the other. Such a boundary is no longer 
conceived in terms of a spatial configuration (or Par-
ergon, ni dedans ni dehors) but as broken up, multifac-
eted and placeless.
As an introduction to the work’s curatorial context or 
frame I will start by commenting further on Morris’ 3 
Ls. The Ls are made of permanent materials, originally 
plywood (1965) and fibreglass and stainless steel in lat-
er versions. They need to be conserved as traditional 
works, stored in a safe and climate-stable place, are 
handled with gloves when displayed and are insured. 
Such operations are so habitual that they appear to be 
quite insignificant but other operations were much less 
habitual. The collector had to understand that the 3 
Ls once packed are not the artwork but only part of it. 
The lawyer had to understand that the work’s original-
ity (the legal basis for intellectual property) did not rest 
in the artist’s hand (the autographic). The curator had 
to understand that the sculpture cannot be presented 
on a plinth, and so on. What was new was the implica-
tion of the curator as a sort of coproducer when the 
work was exhibited, the necessity to reconstruct the 
work in its own terms and from its own point of view 
and relate to it aesthetically through this process. This 
meant placing the 3 Ls in a sort of dialogue with the 
architectural environment, leaving adequate space for 
circulation and regulating the lighting in a sort of dia-
log with the shapes and their reflective surfaces (steel 
or white) as well as with the architectural space – a very 
different situation to hanging pictures within fixed con-
ventions of height, spacing and illumination. Now the 
curator has to operate largely as if he/she were making 
the work. This is also the case of the works by Weiner, 
Gonzalez-Torres, Blazy and other artists mentioned 
earlier, and for most of prevalent contemporary art, 
each case requiring a particular way of being shown 
and administrated. 
From this we can see that another aspect of the cu-
ratorial since the emergence of the contemporary art 
museum is to have become a casuistry. 
Imagine if the 3 Ls were placed in a row on a plinth 
along a wall. They would just not be Morris’ work. The 
work’s sameness (to itself) would be lost and the 3 Ls 
would be altogether something else. No serious cura-
tor would think of showing a painting by Robert Ry-
man on an easel, illuminating Brancusi’s Bird in Space 
with a heavy cast shadow, photographing a sculpture 
by Giacometti from above or Duchamp’s Fountain in 
the round, showing a painting by Ad Reinhardt un-
der changing lighting or Rauschenberg’s White Paint-
ings under an unchanging lighting. Curatorial routine 
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makes us forget about the frame, but we cannot help 
noticing it when it is inadequate.
In finding the adequacy between a work and curatorial 
practices applied to it, the work somehow becomes a 
regulator, an agent that needs to be considered in terms 
of what it “does” and makes us do through causal infer-
ence. The terms constructing the work and the point of 
view with which they get their cohesion, the way it is 
fabricated, its sameness in “presentational immediacy”, 
the way it is shown, handled and administrated, are all 
interdependent operations. This sort of situation seems 
to completely blur any boundary between the work and 
the curatorial context, yet the structural split is at the 
heart of it because curatorial procedures are usually not 
considered as partaking in the work’s terms (topological 
assemblage). There has to be a discreet split between 
the active spectator immersed in an always unfinished 
work and the actor reconstructing from the outside a 
work that is somehow always already made. In the joint 
and split internal and external operations between the 
work and its frame both sides partake in the process 
through which sameness constitutes itself as same-
ness. The object’s processual invariance is relayed at 
the interface by the recursive (iterative) operations of 
the frame. From the point of view of the curatorial, ob-
jects are also events because to each particular object 
belongs a particular collective performance through 
distributed roles that are coordinated by the work (as in 
Distributed Cognition).
In articulating the work and the curatorial as two modes 
of apprehension, from within and from without, in first-
order or second-order observation, they are articulated 
as two dimensions of the same work. Whitehead’s dis-
tinction between presentational immediacy and causal 
efficacy and Deleuze’s distinction between the actual 
and the virtual can in some way be transposed into 
these two dimensions. 
While the object is abstracted in presentational imme-
diacy it co-exists with a virtual field in which sequential 
time is spatialised, a field which is for consciousness 
a peripheral vagueness or subconsciousness without 
which the actual object would have no depth and con-
sistence. Causal efficacy is the omnipresent unactual-
ity within the actual. As Whitehead said, presentational 
immediacy must be correlated with causal efficacy in 
order to have meaning. 
Prevalent assumptions in art and life as in classical phi-
losophy give too large a place to “presentational im-
mediacy,” which is far less important than the entity’s 
“vague” (nonrepresentational) external field of causal 
efficacy. Our environmental mind should not be con-
cealed by the fallacy of the ontological priority of the 
presentational. The object’s causal connection with its 
context is also that of the observer’s mind, it is the field 
of a shared virtual (nonetheless real as Deleuze insists) 
subconscious. Although vague in their coexistence, 
these relations can be cognitively tracked and unfolded 
(or explicated using David Bohm’s term) sequentially 
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one after the other in all directions. Our thinking is in 
things rather than on things or about things.
The joint and split internal and external operations ob-
served between the work and its frame put into question 
the primacy of visuality and phenomenology over art’s 
two-side plasticity and allows nothing of the curatorial 
context to be left as a supplement. 
NOTES
1- Lawrence Weiner considers statements as pieces that can be 
materialized in various ways or just imagined, as formulated in 
his “Declaration of Intent” (1968): 1. The artist may construct 
the piece. 2. The piece may be fabricated. 3. The piece need 
not be built. Each being equal and consistent with the intent 
of the artist the decision as to condition rests with the receiver 
upon the occasion of receivership. 
2- Daniel Buren’s Jamais Deux Fois la Même, in the collec-
tion of the Musée National d’Art Moderne in Paris, is, when 
exhibited, made from the artist’s famous striped wallpaper. In-
structions attached to its certificate state that the piece can be 
presented with any other work in the space but it must entirely 
cover one or several walls, which can be any size. The colour of 
the stripes must change in each exhibition and the piece must 
be dated 1968- followed by the date of the actual exhibition.
3- On Felix Gonzalez-Torres’ Stack of sweets Public Opinion, 
see the case study introduced by Nancy Spector in “Preserv-
ing the Immaterial: A Conference on Variable Media,” at the 
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, on March 30–
31, 2001. 
4- For example Martin Creed’s Work No. 227 (The lights going 
on and off), 2000, which won the Turner Prize in 2001.
5- Michel Blazy’s carrot paste wall coverings can, like Buren’s 
wallpaper, cover one or several walls. They need several days 
in a warm and damp atmosphere for mould to start growing 
before it is left to evolve and decay in a normal atmosphere 
once the exhibition is open to the public.
16 17
6- Alfred North Whitehead. The concept of nature. Tarrner 
lectures delivered in Trinity College, November, 1919 (Cam-
bridge: The University Press,1920). See also: Process and Real-
ity. An Essay in Cosmology. Gifford Lectures Delivered in the 
University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927–1928 (Mac-
millan, New York, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
UK).
7- See Michael Fried’s article “Art and Objecthood” published 
in Artforum in 1967.
8- “/.../ The major aesthetic terms are not in but dependent 
upon this autonomous object and exist as unfixed variables 
that find their definition in the particular space and light and 
physical viewpoint of the spectator.” Robert Morris. “Notes on 
Sculpture,” Artforum, 1/Feb. 1966, 2/Oct. 1966.
9- These points are better developed in my essay: Aav et 
A.Viguier. Logique du Cadre, précédents et conséquences de 
la néo avant-garde (Hôtel des Bains Éditions, 2005). 
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PROCESS INVARIANCE OBJECT. ON 70 PRINTS, EDITION 
2008
Aav, One Shapeless and Colourless painting, 2008
This is a limited edition of prints numbered from 0 to 70. But why is it 
called a multiple if the prints’ form (shape and colour) are all different? 
Because what makes them the same as one another (invariant) is not 
a fixed form but the dynamic pattern (algorithm) producing the varia-
ble forms.  The template is not rigid but fluctuating within a space of 
possibilities. That is where their sameness is.
The prints represent The Object I make and which can be produced 
from a similar algorithm. Moreover, an Object, after Ad Reinhardt’s 
paintings, is always the same Object whatever shape or colour it is.
This method allows for freedom and beauty in the tradition of abstrac-
tion but it only leads to a hollow core.
This edition was not the first of the kind, Bernard Cache had develo-
ped a similar concept of seriality in design.  
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